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Abstract
This study explores the driving force behind the Taper Tantrum of 2013. Following the
Fed’s announcements of potential QE tapering, investors poured of the bond market,
causing yields to rise sharply. This analysis seeks to determine whether this was a
momentum-driven reaction or a return to fundamental values. Throughout this paper,
fundamental determinants of bond prices and investor returns are combined with trading
volume and bid-ask spread data to determine the motivating market force. The findings
suggest that the Taper Tantrum was a return to fundamental bond prices following an
asset bubble burst, likely due to momentum trading.
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I. Introduction
A. Purpose of research
The road to recovery from the financial crisis that began in 2008 was plagued by
economic contraction, volatility, and loss of investor confidence. Historically speaking,
scared investors pour their money into government securities during economic crises, due
to their risk-free nature. For this reason, government bond markets are deemed to be less
risky and more stable than stock markets or other debt instruments, especially during a
recession. While the Fed attempted to keep yields low and stable in the bond market
following the crisis, the suggestion of tapering its massive security purchases triggered a
four-month period of instability. This negative investor reaction and subsequent bond
market volatility was characterized by a sharp spike in yields during the summer of 2013,
in an episode that is now known as the Taper Tantrum (Graph 3). Why? Was the
volatility in bond yields during this time characterized by irrational momentum trading?
Or was it a rational response to overvalued bonds? The purpose of this Honors Thesis is
to examine and explain what happened in the bond market during the Taper Tantrum.

B. Brief summary of research design
Asset prices are thought to be influenced both by rational investors and
momentum traders. When stock prices are higher than fundamental prices (i.e. P/E ratio),
the stock is said to be overpriced and rational investors will begin to sell, inducing the
stock price back to its fundamental level. On the other hand, momentum traders are
heavily influenced by recent price movements, so they wish to ride the wave, so to speak,
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and buy stocks that have been rising. The same logic can be applied to actual and
fundamental bond yields, as price is simply the inverse of the yield.
The research design utilized to answer the questions posed above occurs in three
stages. The first step in determining the dominant bond market force during the Taper
Tantrum was to calculate a proxy for the fundamental bond yield for 10-year U.S.
Treasury bonds to compare with actual yields. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, Treasury security prices are influenced by supply and demand, economic
conditions, monetary policy, and inflation. We defined the fundamental yield based upon
fundamental characteristics such as inflation expectations, stock market returns, the Fed’s
total assets, and important bond market events. The inclusion of sixteen independent
variables representing these factors was done to gauge an accurate calculation of the
fundamental yield. Graph 7 displays the actual and fundamental yields on 10-year
Treasury securities. Actual yields were above fundamental-value yields prior to
November 2011, indicating that bonds were underpriced. The trend then reversed until
June 2013 as actual bond yields were below fundamental-value yields, indicating that
bonds were overpriced.
The second step of our research design was to apply the disparity between actual
and fundamental yields from the first step, to future returns to existing bondholders.
Because the bond market sustained a significant period of being overpriced by our
measures, we expected bond prices to fall (yields to rise) in the future and forwardlooking returns to existing bondholders to fall, which is exactly what happened during the
Taper Tantrum. Graph 8 plots the difference between fundamental and actual yields (Yf-
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Ya) and the forward-looking cumulative semi-annual return. Consistent with rational
expectations trading, the return declined sharply during the period when bonds were
overvalued (2011-2013). The graph also gives evidence that bond prices seemed to
overcorrect, consistent with momentum trading, falling below fundamental value after
mid-June 2013 as yields rose above fundamental values.
The third and final step was to incorporate trading volume data into our analysis
of the driving forces of the bond market during the Taper Tantrum. As seen in Graph 9,
trading volume surged in April 2013, peaking two months later in June, as yields were
rising and bond prices falling. Returning to the stock market analogy, investors will sell
their shares of overvalued stock to get out of the market before their returns take a hit.
During this period, trading volume is high as investors are leaving the market and
momentum picks up, then begins to decline as the market becomes less liquid. We expect
the same behavior in the bond market where high trading volume as the bubble reaches
its peak is followed by a period of declining trading volume as the market corrects and
stabilizes. Overall, the evidence suggests that the Taper Tantrum was partially a return to
fundamental values, and partially driven by momentum as explained by the
overcorrection and subsequent surge in trading volume.

II. Background
A. Context
One of the main functions of the Federal Reserve is to administer monetary policy
as a means of attaining the ultimate economic objectives of full employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates (“The Federal Reserve's Response”). When
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the housing market slowdown of 2007 turned into a full-blown crisis in 2008, the Fed
reacted aggressively in an effort to ease the economic pain and stimulate the economy.
The primary actions taken by the Fed during this time to achieve its monetary policy
goals can be broken into three broad categories: provide liquidity to banks as lender of
last resort, provide liquidity to borrowers and investors, and expand traditional open
market operations at an unprecedented level using LSAPs (large scale asset purchases)
(“The Federal Reserve's Response”). These LSAPs consisted primarily of U.S. Treasury
securities, agency securities, and MBS, and included the purchase of debt further out in
the yield curve than what the Fed normally buys (i.e. 10 and 30-year government bonds).
Graphs 1 and 2 display the amount of U.S. Treasury securities and total assets held by the
Federal Reserve over the course of the financial crisis.

B. Quantitative Easing
The Fed’s large-scale purchases of various debt and collateralized securities
became collectively termed “quantitative easing”, or QE. QE is an unconventional tool of
monetary policy by definition and was employed to put downward pressure on (longterm) interest rates. The first round of QE, known as QE1, began on November 25, 2008
when the Fed announced it would purchase up to $1 billion in agency debt and up to $5
billion in agency MBS over the next several quarters. QE1 was expanded several months
later to allow for the purchase of even more agency debt and MBS, and extended to
longer-term Treasury securities. The Fed held assets of about $2 trillion when QE1 ended
on March 31, 2010. Chairman Ben Bernanke saw the need for continued monetary easing
and thus began QE2 on November 3, 2010. QE2 was more limited in both scope and
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duration and included the purchase of $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities
over the following seven months. The final and most extensive round of quantitative
easing, QE3, began on September 13, 2012 with no targeted end date or total purchase
amount. The Fed initially announced that it would purchase $40 billion of MBS per
month for as long as necessary, which was soon extended to include $45 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities per month. Graph 4 provides further information and
details of each QE program.
Bernanke and the Fed knew that QE could not go on forever and eventually
signaled a future tapering of LSAPs as the nation’s economic outlook continued to
improve during the final round of QE. Bernanke addressed Congress’ Joint Economic
Committee on May 22, 2013 and mentioned that the Fed “could take a step down in the
next two meetings”, when asked about the future of its asset purchases (Fontevecchia).
This comment piqued the interest of bond market investors who understood it to mean the
Fed would soon be tapering and began to sell off their securities (Fontevecchia). The
intentions of the Fed to consider tapering were confirmed during the FOMC press
conference on June 19, 2012 when Bernanke stated “if the subsequent data remain
broadly aligned with our current expectations for the economy, we would continue to
reduce the pace of purchases in measured steps through the first half of next year, ending
purchases around midyear” (The Economic Outlook).
Bernanke’s FOMC statement was followed by a mass exit of investors from the
bond market, causing yields to spike dramatically and prices to drop significantly. Coined
the “Taper Tantrum”, this bond market crisis that began in late May 2013 lasted until
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yields stabilized in September 2013, four months later. Conventional wisdom holds that
market participants overreacted to Bernanke’s statements and the idea of LSAP tapering.
The Taper Tantrum is assumed to have been a brief crisis exacerbated by the momentum
trading of irrational investors. The purpose of our research is to test conventional wisdom
and determine whether investors in the bond market acted in a manner consistent with
fundamental value traders, or irrational momentum trading. Our hypothesis is that the
Taper Tantrum was a return to fundamental bond price values from a previous state of
being overpriced, likely due to momentum trading.

III. Research Methodology
A. Variables
Our hypothesis was tested using U.S. 10-year Treasury bond data. To determine
the driving force behind the Taper Tantrum, the dependent variable was regressed against
three independent variables. The dependent variable, actual semi-annual cumulative
returns, is the forward-looking moving average of UST10Y returns, smoothed on a semiannual basis. This variable considers future semi-annual returns based on the current
yield spread. The three independent variables are: Yf-Ya, bid-ask spread, and trading
volume. Yf-Ya is defined as the difference between the “fundamental yield” and actual
yield on UST10Y bonds. The UST10Y bid-ask spread and trading volume ($ billions) are
both daily values. In short, our model defines the actual and fundamental yield
differential, bid-ask spread, and trading volume to be the fundamental drivers of the
actual semi-annual cumulative return on UST10Y bonds.
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Integral to the regression defined above and the results of this research, is the
calculation of the fundamental yield (Yf), defined as what the UST10Y yields should
have been if the bond market exhibited fundamental values. Yf was calculated in a
separate regression where the dependent variable was defined as a function of sixteen
independent variables: inflation expectations, S&P 500 return, Federal Reserve assets,
announcement of QE1a, announcement of QE1b, announcement of QE2, announcement
of QE3a, announcement of QE3b, tapering of QE1, tapering of QE2, first tapering of
QE3, second tapering of QE3, announcement of CBPP1, announcement of CBPP2,
tapering of CBPP1, and tapering of CBPP2. The dependent variable, daily UST10Y yield
to maturity, was converted from nominal values to the daily change in YTM to reflect the
persistence of the independent variables on yield. The independent variables of inflation
expectations, S&P500 return, and Federal Reserve assets were also adjusted from
nominal values to daily change values for consistency within the model. All QE
announcement and tapering dates were included in the model as fundamental drivers of
the daily change in yield and assigned a dummy variable of either 0 or 1. A value of 1
was assigned to each of the six-day ranges spanning from the day before the event to the
four days following. A value of 0 was assigned to all other days. The announcements and
tapering of the two rounds of the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP), the ECB’s
version of QE, were included in the model to capture the reaction of foreign bond
markets to similar monetary stimulation. The dummy variables assigned the CBPP events
follow the same rule as for QE. All sixteen of these independent variables were included
to determine the most accurate representation of the UST10Y fundamental bond yield as
possible. The results of this regression are found in Graph 11.
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B. Sample period
The sample period used for the overall regression (actual semi-annual cumulative
returns) was constricted by the limited availability of trading volume data. We sampled a
31-month period beginning in May 2011 and lasting until January 2014. This sample
period was then divided into 3 sub-periods revolving around the Taper Tantrum to further
analyze the potential build up and correction of a bond market bubble. The first subperiod, “Pre-Taper Tantrum”, includes the 6 months before the onset of the Taper
Tantrum, from October 19, 2012-April 18, 2013. The second sub-period, “Taper Tantrum
Onset”, is the 3 months before the Taper Tantrum (bubble peak) from April 19, 2013June 18, 2013. The final sub-period, “Post-Taper Tantrum”, includes the 6 months after
the FOMC tapering announcement (bubble correction) from June 19, 2013-December 17,
2013.
The sample period used for the fundamental bond yield regression was much
broader, ranging from January 2003-Jauary 2016. All available data was used to ensure
the most accurate representation of the fundamental yield as possible.

C. Data collection
The data used in both regressions was collected primarily from Federal Reserve
databases. As previously mentioned, a few adjustments were made from the nominal data
to fit the regression models. In the fundamental bond yield regression, the daily change in
UST10Y yield to maturity was regressed to determine how each of the sixteen
independent variables tested impacted the day-to-day change in yield. This required the
conversion of levels to daily change data for the appropriate variables. After the
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regression was run, each coefficient was applied to the appropriate variables to find the
“predicted” or fundamental daily UST10Y yield to maturity. These values were then
adjusted by setting the coefficients for TQE3a and TQE3b equal to 0, in order to predict
what should have happened to the yield when tapering of QE3 was announced. This
adjustment was made to reflect what a rational investor would expect to happen to bond
prices when QE3 was tapered based on the market non-responses to the previous tapers
of QE1 and QE2. Finally, the adjusted predicted daily changes in UST10Y yield to
maturity values were initialized to the yield to maturity level in January 2, 2003 to derive
the yield to maturity levels of the fundamental bond yield. The daily return of UST10Y
bonds was calculated over the broader sample period (2003-2016) using the Morningstar
(2008) methodology. Because markets are forward-looking, the daily returns were
summed as a forward moving average over a 6-month period.

D. Fundamental bond yield
To analyze what happened in the bond market during the Taper Tantrum and to
determine the dominant motivating force, the fundamental yield must be estimated. The
fundamental bond yield indicates our prediction of what UST10Y yields to maturity
should have been if the market was operating at fundamental values. The calculation of
the variable was very important to the overall regression model in measuring how far the
markets deviated from the fundamental levels we predicted. Graph 7 plots both the actual
yield and predicted fundamental yield over the period of Fed intervention following the
economic downtown of the financial crisis (2008-2014). The most significant periods of
deviation between actual and predicted yields are seen during each of the QE
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installments. Interestingly, fundamental yields surpassed actual yields after the ending of
QE2, for the first time since the beginning of QE in 2008, indicating that bonds were
overpriced and that a bubble was building in the market, likely due to momentum trading.
Actual yields caught back up to predicted yields just as the Taper Tantrum was beginning
and continued to rise throughout the summer of 2013. This behavior is indicative of a
market correction, perhaps even an overcorrection, and return to fundamental value
pricing rather than an irrational reaction as conventional wisdom claims.
Graph 5 displays the deviation between actual and fundamental quarterly
cumulative returns, taken from the difference between actual and fundamental returns
found in Graph 10. The fundamental quarterly cumulative returns were calculated using
the predicted fundamental bond yield rather than actual values. The areas shaded red
mark the periods where the difference between actual and fundamental returns was
greater than 2 standard deviations away from the mean. Graph 6 summarizes the time
periods and magnitude of the deviations. The two most significant periods are
observations 2 and 8, with observation 8 being the Taper Tantrum. Using a weighted
average, we determined that approximately 3 months elapsed from the time the deviation
first entered the red zone to when it returned to and crossed the mean. An average of 4
months elapsed from the time the period of deviation first departed the mean to when it
returned, which is approximately the duration of the Taper Tantrum. These findings
provide further evidence that the deviation between actual and fundamental returns was
alleviated by a market correction and return to fundamental values.
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IV. Results
Once the determination of the fundamental yield (Yf) was complete, our overall
regression model could be run. The three independent variables used, Yf-Ya, bid-ask
spread, and trading volume, were statistically significant in explaining the behavior of
actual semi-annual cumulative returns. The difference between fundamental and actual
yields (Yf-Ya) indicates how far actual bond market yields deviated from their
fundamental levels; the higher the absolute value difference, the greater the deviation.
When the difference is positive, the bond is overpriced; when the difference is negative,
the bond is underpriced. We expect the bursting of a bubble to occur when securities are
overpriced and we expect the coefficient of Yf-Ya to be negative, indicating that the bond
market was correcting and returning back to fundamental yield levels during the Taper
Tantrum. There is no strong theory of the behavior of the bid-ask spread during a bubble
correction, thus we had no prediction for the coefficient of that variable. Trading volume
is the final important indicator of bond market bubble activity. The bursting of a bubble is
typically accompanied by high trading volume as investors begin to panic and leave the
market (Gjerstad and Smith). This behavior should be reflected by a positive coefficient
when the bubble builds, and a negative coefficient when the bubble corrects. Therefore,
we expect the coefficient for trading volume to be negative in our model, indicating a
market correction.
The results of the actual cumulative return regression support our hypothesis that
the Taper Tantrum was a period of falling bond prices returning to fundamental values,
followed by a market overcorrection likely due to momentum trading. The coefficient for
Yf-Ya is negative as expected, indicating that the bond market was indeed overpriced as
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the bubble was building and experienced a period of correction during the Taper
Tantrum. The coefficient for the bid ask spread is positive, indicating that a positive
relationship exists between the spread and return for bond investors during a bubble
correction period. The coefficient for trading volume is also negative as expected, a
further indication of a market correction. Graph 12 includes the results of this regression
model.
To put the output into context of what was actually happening in the bond market
at the time of the Taper Tantrum, the impact of the Fed’s LSAPs must be examined. The
massive and unprecedented purchases of debt, namely UST10Y bonds, lasted for over
four years and had significant impacts on the bond market. The Fed continually injected
huge sums of money into the bond market creating an artificially high demand for 10Y
bonds in an effort to keep interest rates close to zero. A speculative bubble is defined as
“a situation in which the market price of investment instruments or other properties has
risen to a point which exceeds reasonable valuation and is not sustainable”, which is
exactly what had occurred in the bond market as a result of the Fed’s actions. Although
this was intentional, a bubble had built up nonetheless. The rational response to a
speculative bubble peak is to get out of the market before it collapses/corrects. When
Bernanke mentioned the future tapering of the Fed’s QE program, meaning an imminent
increase in interest rates, the rational response for market participants was to sell. This
widespread sell-off of UST10Y bonds in response to Bernanke’s testimony triggered a
market correction and return to fundamental values from the previous state of overpriced
bonds due to momentum trading. Conventional wisdom would have you believe that the
Taper Tantrum was caused by investor panic and irrationality, however; the presence of a
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speculative bubble in the bond market induced by the Fed’s LSAPs indicates that the
Taper Tantrum was rather a fundamentally-driven market reaction.
Another point to consider is the timing of the Taper Tantrum. It is clear that
overvalued bonds must eventually return to fundamental values after an intermediate
period of deviation, but why did this occur in June 2013? In their paper on “Bubbles and
Crashes”, Abreu and Brunnermeier address coordination as an economic theory, which
provides a possible answer to the question of timing. A bubble burst is characterized by a
sufficient number of investors leaving the market; a single investor cannot accomplish
this alone. News events often function as the synchronizing element allowing investors to
successfully burst an asset bubble. The almost-immediate yield increase following
Bernanke’s tapering announcement suggests that his testimony before Congress and the
FOMC meeting shortly after, serve as “coordination devices” for the bond market
reaction. Both news events were widely reported and speculated amongst bond market
investors, and were followed by the inevitable bursting of an asset bubble. Thus,
characterizing Bernanke and the Fed’s news events as coordination devices allowing
investors to synchronize a mass exit from the bond market, provides a possible
explanation for the timing of the Taper Tantrum.
The same regression model was run within the smaller sample periods previously
defined to provide further evidence in support of our hypothesis. These regression
outputs can be found in Graphs 13-15. The independent variable coefficients in the PostTT regression (Graph 15) are consistent with those in the overall model, confirming the
classification of the Taper Tantrum as a market correction rather than overreaction.
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V. Conclusion
QE3 wrapped up on October 29, 2014 after the Fed had accumulated over $3.5
trillion in assets on its balance sheet. The administration and effects of QE are
controversial and widely debated, but the Federal Reserve did succeed in keeping interest
rates historically low (Kearns). More recently, the bond market has continued to operate
in state of volatility over the uncertainty of the Fed and raising interest rates due to
economic improvement and stability. The findings of our research indicate that the Fed’s
massive injection of money into the bond market did indeed create an asset bubble by
definition, and that market participants were rational in their response to the Fed’s
signaled withdrawal of funds. It is important to remember Sir Isaac Newton’s wisdom of
“what goes up, must come down” when considering asset bubbles. When the Fed
artificially inflated bond prices using unconventional and temporary monetary policy
tools, investors were correct in realizing that when the Fed stepped out, prices would fall.
Thus, we have properly defined the Taper Tantrum as a rational market correction and
return to fundamental values.
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Graph 8
Fundamental-Actual YTM and Semi-Annual Cumulative Returns
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UST10Y YTM and Trading Volume ($ billions)
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UST10Y Fundamental Bond Yield Regression
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.532687871
R Square
0.283756368
Adjusted R Square
0.27990171
Standard Error
0.05109003
Observations
2990
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
dinflation_expectations
Sp500Return
lnFedAssets
AQE1a
AQE1b
AQE2
AQE3a
AQE3b
TQE1
TQE2
TQE3a
TQE3b
ACBPP1
ACBPP2
TCBPP1
TCBPP2

16
2973
2989

SS
MS
F
Significance F
3.074341233 0.192146 73.61389
1.7161E-201
7.760098366 0.00261
10.8344396

Coefficients
Standard Error
0.013854105
0.020717091
0.628056588
0.026924627
1.30132047
0.080854375
-0.001040716
0.001452345
-0.138602183
0.020948274
-0.086441352
0.020916056
0.009225513
0.020890111
-0.0042994
0.020908799
0.03127988
0.020900851
-0.018281335
0.020907777
-0.002851359
0.02090735
0.036023211
0.020911381
0.085260535
0.020917446
-0.010069455
0.019339835
0.040534991
0.020911333
0.014588178
0.020901297
-0.006841621
0.02089848

t Stat
0.668728
23.32647
16.09462
-0.71658
-6.6164
-4.13277
0.441621
-0.20563
1.496584
-0.87438
-0.13638
1.722661
4.076049
-0.52066
1.938422
0.697956
-0.32737

P-value
0.503721
1.2E-110
6.02E-56
0.473692
4.35E-11
3.68E-05
0.658796
0.837097
0.134608
0.381982
0.89153
0.085054
4.7E-05
0.602643
0.052666
0.48526
0.743408

Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
-0.026767185 0.054475396 -0.026767185 0.054475396
0.575263796 0.680849379 0.575263796 0.680849379
1.142784263 1.459856676 1.142784263 1.459856676
-0.003888419 0.001806987 -0.003888419 0.001806987
-0.179676768 -0.097527598 -0.179676768 -0.097527598
-0.127452765 -0.045429938 -0.127452765 -0.045429938
-0.031735027 0.050186053 -0.031735027 0.050186053
-0.045296583 0.036697783 -0.045296583 0.036697783
-0.009701719 0.072261479 -0.009701719 0.072261479
-0.059276515 0.022713844 -0.059276515 0.022713844
-0.043845701 0.038142984 -0.043845701 0.038142984
-0.004979035 0.077025458 -0.004979035 0.077025458
0.044246396 0.126274674 0.044246396 0.126274674
-0.047990273 0.027851363 -0.047990273 0.027851363
-0.00046716 0.081537143 -0.00046716 0.081537143
-0.026394295 0.055570652 -0.026394295 0.055570652
-0.047818571 0.034135329 -0.047818571 0.034135329

Graph 12

UST10Y Return Regression: Full Sample
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.746645048
R Square
0.557478827
Adjusted R Square
0.555461254
Standard Error
0.050363092
Observations
662
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Yf-Ya
BidAskSpread
Tvol

3
658
661

SS
2.102543466
1.668978183
3.771521648

Coefficients
Standard Error
-0.084282809 0.029341934
-0.100588294 0.004116646
0.116991559 0.015136472
-0.003338769
0.00028487

MS
F
Significance F
0.700847822 276.312
4.983E-116
0.002536441

t Stat
P-value
-2.872435353
0.0042
-24.43452888 2.5E-94
7.72911678 4.1E-14
-11.72031947
6E-29

Lower 95%
-0.14189792
-0.108671639
0.087269949
-0.003898133

Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%
Upper 95.0%
-0.026667697
-0.14189792 -0.026667697
-0.092504948 -0.108671639 -0.092504948
0.146713168 0.087269949 0.146713168
-0.002779405 -0.003898133 -0.002779405

Graph 13

UST10Y Return Regression: Pre-Taper Tantrum (October 19, 2012-April 18, 2013)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.558539279
0.311966127
0.29447374
0.045948044
122

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Yf-Ya
BidAskSpread
Tvol

3
118
121

SS
MS
F
Significance F
0.112957141 0.03765 17.8344
1.30147E-09
0.249124289 0.00211
0.36208143

Coefficients
Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
-0.222318477
0.249358721 -0.89156 0.37444
-0.341434339
0.076391602 -4.46953 1.8E-05
0.314861462
0.141157187 2.23057
0.0276
-0.006121522
0.001141381 -5.36326 4.1E-07

Lower 95%
-0.716116631
-0.492710508
0.035331801
-0.008381767

Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%
Upper 95.0%
0.271479678 -0.716116631 0.271479678
-0.19015817 -0.492710508
-0.19015817
0.594391123 0.035331801 0.594391123
-0.003861278 -0.008381767 -0.003861278

Graph 14

UST10Y Return Regression: Taper Tantrum Onset (April 19, 2013-June 18, 2013)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.93774985
0.879374781
0.869851738
0.011595769
42

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Yf-Ya
BidAskSpread
Tvol

3
38
41

SS
MS
F
Significance F
0.037249343 0.01242 92.3418
1.66398E-17
0.005109551 0.00013
0.042358894

Coefficients
Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
-0.122437611
0.097090979 -1.26106 0.21497
-0.057193183
0.015571257
-3.673 0.00074
-0.018565833
0.060605895 -0.30634 0.76102
0.001744689
0.000404324 4.31507 0.00011

Lower 95%
-0.318988022
-0.088715546
-0.141256053
0.000926178

Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%
Upper 95.0%
0.0741128 -0.318988022
0.0741128
-0.025670821 -0.088715546 -0.025670821
0.104124386 -0.141256053 0.104124386
0.002563201 0.000926178 0.002563201

Graph 15

UST10Y Return Regression: Post-Taper Tantrum (June 19, 2013-December 17, 2013)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.652385123
0.425606349
0.411365184
0.017775055
125

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Yf-Ya
BidAskSpread
Tvol

3
121
124

SS
0.028327336
0.038230261
0.066557597

MS
0.00944
0.00032

F
Significance F
29.8856
1.57538E-14

Coefficients
Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
-0.054263146
0.080594249 -0.67329 0.50205
-0.102355054
0.011115698 -9.20815 1.2E-15
0.041024654
0.053744257 0.76333 0.44675
-0.001258549
0.000429479 -2.93041 0.00405

Lower 95%
-0.21382072
-0.124361509
-0.065376279
-0.002108815

Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%
Upper 95.0%
0.105294428
-0.21382072 0.105294428
-0.080348598 -0.124361509 -0.080348598
0.147425586 -0.065376279 0.147425586
-0.000408282 -0.002108815 -0.000408282

